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NOTES
STATE PRIORITY TO SALES TAX PROCEEDS IN BANKRUPTCY
In the special session of the 1963 Indiana General Assembly an act
amending the Gross Income Tax of 1933 and imposing a sales tax on cer-
tain retail transactions was passed.' A section of that act provides that
the retail merchant acts as an agent for the state in collecting the sales tax,
which is imposed on the consumer. Taxes so collected "shall constitute a
trust fund in the hands of the retail merchant and shall be owned by the
state," according to the statute.' The imposition of the burden of collect-
ing the tax on retail merchants was attacked on constitutional grounds as
demanding service without just compensation;' but the attack failed be-
cause the retailer is allowed to charge four per cent on transactions of
twenty-five cents yet need only pay the state two per cent of taxable
transactions.4 This permits the retailer an opportunity "within the frame-
work of the law to recover monies in the nature of compensation for the
services required of him."' Now, each time a merchant collects sales tax
from a customer part of the money received is his own compensation for
collecting the tax and part of it is in trust for the state to be held until
return and payment to the state is made.' With the constitutionality of
this collection method settled it remains to be seen how it will operate to
assure that the state will receive the taxes in certain instances.
The statutory lien is the traditional device used by the states to as-
sure collection of both taxes and other claims. However, in proceedings
under the Bankruptcy Act' the lien may fail to achieve its purpose, since
under section 67c,' tax liens on personal property not accompanied by pos-
session are postponed to administrative expenses and wage claims. The
sales tax trust aspires to improve the state's position over its customary
statutory lien status; and the field seems clear to do it, since the Bank-
ruptcy Act does not contain a direct limitation on the use of statutory
1. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 64-2601 to -2667 (Bums Supp. 1964).
2. IND. ANN. STAT. § 64-2664 (Burns Supp. 1964).
3. IND. CoNsr. art. 1, § 21 says, "No man's particular services shall be demanded
vithout just compensation."
4. IND. ANN. STAT. § 64-2651 (Burns Supp. 1964).
5. Welsh v. Sells, - Ind. - , 192 N.E.2d 753, 764 (1963).
6. IND. ANN. STAT. § 64-2666 (Burns Supp. 1964).
7. Bankruptcy Act §§ 1-755, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255
(1958).
8. Bankruptcy Act § 67(c), 70 Stat. 427(c) (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c) (1958).
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trust formulas.9
The intended effect of the statutory trust is, of course, to prevent
the inclusion of taxes collected by the merchant in the merchant's estate
in bankruptcy or other insolvency proceedings."0 In the case of bank-
ruptcy, where the trustee is vested by operation of law "with the title of
the bankrupt" to all of the bankrupt's property," the significance of a
trust claim rests on the point of law that when the trustee takes title only
as a fiduciary the court should turn the property over to its "true" owner. 2
The trustee obtains only naked legal title to the trust, and the beneficial
interest is not disturbed by the bankruptcy proceedings. This proposition
is so elementary that it has never been seriously disputed ;"3 and no excep-
tion to it for statutory trusts has yet been made. The trustee in bank-
ruptcy is not regarded as a bona fide purchaser with respect to trust funds
9. In non-bankruptcy proceedings mere federal "claims" generally fare better than
state liens, usually by reason of Rav. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1946):
Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or whenever
the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executors or adminis-
trators, is insufficient to pay debts due from the deceased, the debts due to
the United States shall be first satisfied, and the priority established shall
extend as well to cases in which a debtor, not having sufficient property to
pay all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment thereof, or in which the
estate and effects of an absconding, concealed, or absent debtor are attached
by process of law, as to cases in which an act of bankruptcy is committed.
Under the doctrine of "inchoateness," the state tax lien is held to 'be a mere general,
unperfected lien not excepted from the operation of § 3466, unless it has acquired
"specificity," i.e., unless specific property has been attached and reduced to possession.
See, e.g., United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S. 361, 366 (1953).
There is a dearth of cases as to the effect of § 3466 on a state-created tax trust.
However, the trust device should succeed here if it is found to create a valid trust. Sec-
tion 3466 applies only to property of the debtor. Conrad v. The Atlantic Ins. Co., 26
U.S. (1 Pet.) 386, 438 (1828). Since the proceeds of tax collection held by the merchant-
debtor are not his property, they would be beyond the reach of § 3466. The court of
claims so held in The Batavia Publishing Co. v. United States, 96 Ct Cl. 166 (1942).
And it has been held that § 3466 would not apply to subordinate one of two tax trust
claims, one of which was state-created and one of which was federally-created. Rivard
v. Bijou Furniture Co, 67 R.I. 251, 21 A.2d 563 (1941).
10. The statutory trust is not new. The prototype New York statute dates back to
1930. "The funds received by a contractor from an owner for the improvement of real
property are hereby declared to constitute trust funds in the hands of such contractor
to be applied first to the payment of claims of subcontractors, architects, engineers, sur-
veyors, laborers and materialmen. .. ." N.Y. Sess. Laws 1930, ch. 859, § 18. This
provision was amended in 1958. N.Y. LIEN LAW §§ 70-79 (Supp. 1964). Favoring ma-
terialmen with a statutory trust can be explained because their outlay has effectively in-
creased the value of the construction project, and the financially hazardous building
trades may be deemed to merit this statutory protection. Justification for the state tax
trust surely must proceed on a different basis. The statutory trust is familiar in federal
law with regard to taxes withheld from employee's paychecks by employers. INT. PRzv.
CODE of 1954, § 7501.
11. Bankruptcy Act § 70, 66 Stat. 429 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1958).
12. Todd v. Petit, 108 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1939) ; In re Coffin, 152 Fed. 381 (2d
Cir. 1907) ; In re Tate-Jones & Co., 85 F. Supp. 971 (W.D. Pa. 1949).
13. The rule is not different for implied or constructive trusts. In re Franklin Say.
& Loan Co., 34 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Tenn. 1940).
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held by the bankrupt debtor.' 4 Trust funds received by a trustee must be
paid to their beneficiaries prior to making disbursements to lienholders
or other creditors of the bankrupt estate.'
In opposition to the trust device, it is suggested by good authority
that the device is nothing but a statutory lien in disguise,'" and it is argued
that all state-created priorities, except that for rent owing to a landlord
under applicable state law,' 7 have been abolished. Therefore, the argu-
ment goes, state-created statutory trusts should be treated like statutory
liens under the Bankruptcy Act. Judicial response to this argument has
been slight." Nevertheless, the similarity between state-created trusts
and liens has not gone unnoticed.' Although the arguments against the
statutory trust have merit, it seems that each statutory trust should be
analyzed individually. If it is found to be a state-created attempt to
avoid the priorities of the Bankruptcy Act, there is nothing to preclude
a federal court from regarding it in its true light. If, however, the crea-
tion of a trust for sales tax proceeds received by a retail merchant is in
all respects in harmony with that method of tax collection, there should
be no compulsion to call the trust a lien merely because it is imposed by
statute. The Indiana statute must therefore be interpreted to create a
valid trust if it is to be successful.
The statute does not require segregation of sales tax proceeds, nor
does segregation seem to be a common practice among retail merchants.
Therefore, the state probably will find it necessary to claim its trust fund
from whatever cash can be found in the debtor's bank account. If no
cash can be found, the state will attempt to impress its trust on the pro-
ceeds of the sale of the debtor's assets. Given the validity of the trust,
the state may have this second obstacle to face in satisfying requirements
as to tracing of the funds collected by the merchant.
I. THE VALIDITY OF THE STATUTORY TRUST AS A DEVICE TO
SECURE A PRIORITY
A trust device similar to Indiana's withstood a broadside attack that
14. Grodsky v. Sipe, 30 F. Supp. 656, 662 (E.D. Ill. 1940).
15. City of Dallas v. Crippen, 171 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1949).
16. 4 COLLmR, BANKRUPTCY 1 67.25(2) (14th ed. 1964). With respect to the ma-
terialmen's trust, see note 10 supra, the fear was voiced that the limitations placed on
statutory liens by the Chandler Act, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (codified in scattered sections
of 11 U.S.C.), were "breaking down under the impact" of the statutory device. Note,
50 YALE L.J. 1268 (1941).
17. Bankruptcy Act § 64(a) (5), 70 Stat. 725 (1956); 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (5)
(1958).
18. Wickes Boiler Co. v. Godfrey-Keller Co., 116 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1940).
19. "The creation of this trust right was wholly a local question, and the Federal
court will observe it. [citations omitted]. As liens, assuming these claims amount to
such, they are not affected 'by the Bankruptcy Act...." In re Heintzelman Constr. Co.,
34 F. Supp. 109, 111 (W.D.N.Y. 1940).
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it was a city (state) -created priority and therefore contrary to the policy
of the Bankruptcy Act in City of New York v. Rassner.2 ° In that case,
the debtor remained in possession of his assets to conduct business under
an arrangement plan as provided in Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act.2"
The debtor eventually was adjudicated bankrupt. The trustee, who re-
ceived $7.50 as the debtor's only cash assets, was able to augment the
estate in the amount of $3,100 by selling the debtor's chattels and invali-
dating certain chattel mortgages. New York City claimed two-thirds of
the fund as sales taxes which had been collected while the debtor was in
possession.
As to the question of the city (state) priority, the court said:
Of course, an overriding policy of the Bankruptcy Act could
prevent preferred satisfaction of even trust claims. Just as the
question of what is a 'tax' under § 64, sub. (a) (4), is a federal
one [citations omitted], so the question of proper distribution
of estates and proper priorities is federal [citations omitted]
except in so far as the Bankruptcy Act specifically makes state
law controlling [citation omitted]. Nevertheless, barring any
strong policy in the Bankruptcy Act, state law determines what
is and what is not a trustee. If New York City wishes to ob-
tain a preferred position by making all vendors trustees, it may
do so. And so long as the Bankruptcy Act recognizes state
rules as to trustees, the city will succeed.22
The court found two flaws in the argument that the city (state) ob-
tained an inequitable priority by the trust device. First, the Bankruptcy
Act recognizes that where a business is continued after its owner becomes
bankrupt, the receiver is subject to local taxes like any other individual. 3
Second, any governmental agency may secure for itself a more favorable
priority as to taxes arising prior to bankruptcy by creating liens for its
taxes.24 It followed, according to the court, that if Congress was content
to give tax collectors such a preferred position, the city was not violating
the generalities of the Bankruptcy Act by protecting itself against being
subjected to the priority rules of distribution. The Rassner court did not,
however, consider the validity of the statutory trust as a trust. It only
ruled on the relationship to the Bankruptcy Act of a statutory trust which
20. 127 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1942).
21. Bankruptcy Act §§ 301-99, 52 Stat. 905-16 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-99 (1958).
22. City of New York v. Rassner, 127 F.2d 703, 706 (2d Cir. 1942).
23. Id. at 707. See Bankruptcy Act § 397, 52 Stat. 915 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 797
(1958).
24. Ibid.
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the court apparently assumed to be valid. The court could have found a
policy argument in the Bankruptcy Act that the entire scheme of the act
is to determine the distribution of bankrupts' estates and that state-created
priorities should not be allowed to thwart that plan. Nevertheless, the
court may have been on sound footing in refusing to tamper with state
trust law without an express mandate from Congress.
The Rassner holding was cited with brief but apparently complete
approval by the Sixth Circuit in Hercules Serv. Parts Corp. v. United
States.2" The court did not consider the possibility that the statutory
trust might be treated as a lien; it stated only that "we agree with the
Second Circuit in the Rassner case . . . that the allowing of a priority
to the Government here does not violate the 'generalities' of section 64
of the Bankruptcy Act.""0 However, the Hercules case is different from
Rassner in that the trust sought to be imposed was for federal social se-
curity taxes withheld from employee wages. Two points of distinction
emerge: (1) Hercules concerned a federally-created tax trust with re-
spect to the federal Bankruptcy Act; (2) the rights of third parties, the
employees whose wages had been withheld, were involved at least col-
laterally. Although Hercules may be significant in its approval of Rass-
ner, it is not authority to support Rassner's holding as applied to a state-
imposed trust.
The tax trust scheme also has withstood an indirect attack based on
an argument that taxes should be considered costs and expenses of ad-
ministration. In 1952 the Bankruptcy Act was amended, and one of the
new provisions concerned the priority payment of costs and expenses of
administration in bankruptcy. In re Airline-Arista Printing Corp.2"
arose with a fact situation similar to the Hercules case. The argument
against the trust for withheld taxes was that taxes should be considered
costs and expenses of the arrangement proceeding even though they were
denominated trust funds. Since the 1952 amendment had changed the
Bankruptcy Act to subordinate costs and expenses of the arrangement
proceeding to costs and expenses of the bankruptcy administration, it was
argued that the trust fund should not be satisfied until expenses of the
25. 202 F.2d 938 (6th Cir. 1953).
26. Id. at 941.
27. The amendatory language was:
Provided, however, That where an order is entered in a proceeding under any
chapter of this title directing that bankruptcy 'be proceeded with, costs and ex-
penses of administration incurred in the ensuing bankruptcy proceeding shall
have priority in advance of payment of the unpaid costs and expenses of admin-
istration, including the allowances provided for in such chapter, incurred in the.
superseded proceeding and in the suspended bankruptcy proceeding, if any.
Bankruptcy Act § 64, 66 Stat. 426 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
28. 156 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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bankruptcy administration were paid. After paying the tax trust there
would have been insufficient assets to cover expenses incurred in the ad-
ministration and liquidation after bankruptcy, including compensation to
the trustee, his attorneys, the appraiser, the official stenographer, and the
referee. Nevertheless, the district court ruled that the 1952 amendment
had changed nothing with regard to the trust claim, and assets coming
into the hands of the trustee were impressed with the trust. The trust
was again recognized on the Rassiwr principle.29
In sum, the federal courts which have had opportunity to consider
the question of whether the statutory trust is consistent with the policy
of the Bankruptcy Act have been disinclined to find a conflict in the ab-
sence of specific legislative declaration on the matter. Indeed, it may be
contended that, in any case, the device does no violence to the essential
policies of the act.
From a conceptual standpoint, the case in which the bankrupt serves
as collector of the tax from another differs radically from the more usual
one where he is himself the taxpayer. Where the legally contemplated in-
cidence of the tax is on the purchaser, the retailer, in his function as col-
lector, assumes the character of a conduit."0 The funds temporarily in
his possession are there only because of the peculiarities of the statutory
scheme of collection. They are related only superficially to the retailer's
normal economic activity, and the Bankruptcy Act is only concerned with
the equitable distribution of the ordinary fruits of that activity. Viewed
in this light, the statutory trust appears to be reasonably consistent with
the fundamental nature of the relation between the state and the retailer;
the retailer's retention of bare legal title is not grossly out of place.
While it is reasonably probable, in the light of these considerations,
29. Id. at 407. In all three cases, Rassner, Hercules, and Airline-Arista, the courts
were concerned only with trusts sought to be imposed on funds collected after bankruptcy
by the receiver or the debtor in possession. The issue of the propriety of imposition of
the statutory trust on funds collected prior to bankruptcy does not appear to have arisen;
however, the essential question is the same in this situation.
The closest analogy to be found is In re Heintzelman Constr. Co., 34 F. Supp. 109
(W.D.N.Y. 1940), where New York's statutory trust for materialmen was upheld. The
case was criticized for the failure of the court to look through the state-created statu-
tory trust and to treat it as a lien. Note, 50 YALE L.J. 1268 (1941).
30. The same rationale appears in Hercules Serv. Parts Corp. v. United States, 202
F.2d 938 (6th Cir. 1953), in connection with the court's holding that the federal govern-
ment need not trace the employees' income and social security taxes withheld by the
bankrupt employer: "[I]f restitution is made the creditors will receive no less than that
to which they were originally entitled and that which they would have received if the
officer of the law had performed his obligation." Id. at 941. But see text accompanying
note 85 infra for criticism of the rationale as applied to the question of tracing.
In light of these considerations, the objections of commentators, while perhaps jus-
tified with respect to the New York materialmen's trust, do not appear proper when
applied to the tax trust. See note 29 supra.
that the statutory tax trust, as an abstract device, will escape broad judi-
cial condemnation, a given statutory scheme, when viewed in its totality,
may fail if it does not reasonably reflect the real nature of the relation
between the state and the retailer. There is a considerable body of
authority to the effect that, when the application of a federal statute is
called into question, the state's characterization of the jural nature of a
thing or relation is not necessarily controlling. Thus, in Morgan v. Coln-
mnissioner," where the court held that a power of appointment deemed
"special" by state statute and decision was to be considered "general" for
federal tax purposes, it said, "if it is found . . . that an interest or right
created by local law was the object intended to be taxed, the federal law
must prevail no matter what name is given the interest or right by state
law."" Prevalence of federal law may become decisive if the legally in-
tended incidence of the tax is not upon the purchaser but upon the seller
because then the character of the seller would be no longer that of mere
custodian; he would become the taxpayer, even though as a matter of eco-
nomics he might pass the burden of the tax along to the purchaser.
An analogy may be found in the case of In re Tele-Tone Radio
Corp."a There the bankruptcy court ordered the debtor in possession to
segregate from other funds all monies withheld from employees or col-
lected from others as taxes under the laws of the United States or any
state. When the debtor was adjudicated bankrupt, after having complied
with the order, the United States claimed the entire tax fund, which was
composed of withheld social security taxes intermingled with federal
manufacturer's excise taxes as a trust."4 The court ruled that the United
States was entitled to claim a trust as to the social security portion of the
tax fund but not as to the excise tax portion. Although the excise tax
law allows the manufacturer to pass the tax on to his purchasers, the
manufacturer is primarily responsible for payment of the tax. In the
court's opinion, it followed that the asserted trust fund for the excise
31. 309 U.S. 78 (1939).
32. Id. at 80-81. See also Board of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1 (1923), where
the Court held that although the state courts considered a membership on the board not
to be "property" of the bankrupt it would consider it to be property for the purposes of
the Bankruptcy Act. The Court stated, "[W]here the bankrupt law deals with property
rights which are regulated by the state law, the Federal Courts in bankruptcy will follow
the state courts; but when the language of Congress indicates a policy requiring a broader
construction of the statute than the state decisions would give it, Federal Courts cannot
be concluded by them." Id. at 10. And see United States v. R. F. Ball Constr. Co., 355
U.S. 587 (1958) ; United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S. 361 (1953); Rivard v.
Bijou Furniture, 67 R.I. 251, 21 A.2d 563 (1941).
33. 133 F. Supp. 739 (D.N.J. 1955).
34. The employer holds withheld social security taxes in trust for the United States.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7501. However, the federal excise tax law does not contain an
implied trust provision.
NOTES 239
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taxes collected did not have "a proper basis" in the tax statute." The
holding of Tele-Tone is that the test to determine whether collected taxes
in the hands of a dealer can be treated as in trust is not whether the taxes
are actually collected from or "passed on" to the purchaser but rather is
the character of the tax itself.
The success of the Indiana sales tax trust may thus depend upon the
"character" assigned to it. The statute in its present form is ambiguous
as to this point. On the one hand, the merchant is required to collect the
tax from the purchaser; on the other, he is held personally liable for two
per cent of his gross income from taxable transactions, irrespective of
whether he collects from his purchasers or not." The intended incidence
of the tax is not clear. A similar sales tax having an apparent double
incidence has been recognized. It was first argued that if the tax was
levied on the consumer with the vendor acting merely as a collection agent
for the state, when the trust fund could not be traced or when the vendor
failed to collect it the amount due would become a debt from the vendor
to the state with a fifth priority, rather than a tax claim against the
vendor with a fourth priority. The amount due could not properly be
classified as a tax claim, the argument went, because it was not the vendor
who was being taxed. The argument was accepted by the Second Circuit
in City of New York v. Goldstein, 7 with the result that the plaintiff, who
claimed a fourth priority on the basis of a tax lien, was relegated to the
fifth priority along with other general creditors. However, at the time
that case was decided the Court of Appeals of New York had not yet con-
strued the New York City sales tax. It did so subsequently in In re Atlas
Television Co.8 On appeal the United States Supreme Court reversed
Goldstein.9 An explanation for this reversal is found in lit re Jayrose
Milling Co.4" The Jayrose court explained that although the consumer
was the primary taxpayer, the vendor was not relieved from payment of
35. In re Tele-Tone Radio Corp., 133 F. Supp. 739, 743 (N.J. 1955).
36. IND. ANN. STAT. § 64-2664 (Bums Supp. 1964):
The state gross retail tax . . . shall be collected by the retail merchant, as
agent for the state of Indiana, from the purchaser of property or services
furnished in the transaction subject to said taxes as a separate added amount
not part of the price or consideration. Notwithstanding the amount of state
gross retail tax . . . collected from purchasers, the retail merchant shall be
liable for and shall remit . . . 2% of the gross income of the retail merchant
from taxable transactions. . . . Every retail merchant shall be personally liable
for such taxes, which shall constitute a trust fund in the hands of the retail
merchant and shall be owned by the state.
37. 84 F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1936).
38. 273 N.Y. 51, 6 N.E.2d 94 (1936).
39. City of New York v. Goldstein, 299 U.S. 522 (1936).
40. 93 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1937). And see City of New York v. Feiring, 313 U.S.
283 (1941).
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the tax if he failed to collect it from the consumer. The vendor's obliga-
tion to pay the tax was not measured by the amount of the tax collected,
nor was it dependent upon failure to exercise diligence in collecting the
tax. It was an obligation measured by the receipts of the vendor.41
Therefore, if the vendor failed to collect the sales tax from the consumer,
the tax was levied on the vendor. The rationale of these cases was given
a gloss by the Second Circuit in the Rassner42 case. That court reasoned
that the Supreme Court had recognized that the vendor might be assigned
alternative capacities by a statutory scheme and that New York had
merely decided that one of those capacities was that of trustee where he
actually collected the tax.43 But in the cases in question the Supreme
Court merely decided that the personal liability of the vendor if he did not
collect from his purchasers did not destroy the status of the tax as a
"tax" for the purposes of the fourth priority in bankruptcy. The Court
most certainly did not reach the question of whether, in view of the mer-
chant's underlying liability for the tax, he might still be considered a
trustee of funds actually collected from purchasers. These cases provide
neither authority nor conceptual basis for the Second Circuit's holding
in Rassner.
Thus, the question of whether the Indiana sales tax statute truly
establishes a trustee-beneficiary relationship between the retail merchant
and the state must be faced. The tax is borne primarily by the purchaser.
Yet, payment of the tax by the retail merchant is not gauged by actual
collections made." It is measured either by (1) two per cent of gross
income on taxable transactions or (2) two per cent of the sale price from
the sale of property subject to the tax. A nice question would arise under
the Indiana statute if a merchant actually segregated tax proceeds and
they were stolen, lost, or destroyed through no fault of his own. The
trust provision tabbing the funds as "owned by the state" might not be
invoked so readily as the provision, "the retail merchant shall be liable
for and shall remit. . .. ,"" Under such circumstances it would have to
be determined who the real "taxpayer" under the statute is. In a similar
situation, the Court of Appeals of Georgia ruled that a retail merchant
was only liable for reasonable care in safekeeping the tax proceeds." The
merchant was deemed to hold taxes collected in trust for the state; and
41. The Indiana statute is similarly constructed. See note 36 supra.
42. City of New York v. Rassner, 127 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1942).
43. Id. at 705.
44. Presumably, this would be unconstitutional. See note 3 supra.
45. IND. AmN. STAT. § 64-2664 (Burns Supp. 1964). For the text of the provision,
see note 36 supra.
46. Bear's Den, Inc. v. Georgia, 97 Ga. App. 288, 102 S.E.2d 915 (1958).
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when they were stolen through no fault of his own, he had no further
liability for the tax. This interesting decision was reversed by the Su-
preme Court of Georgia, which construed the sales tax statute to declare
the dealer to be the "taxpayer" under the statute despite the statute's
language:
The privilege tax herein levied . . . shall be collected by the
dealer from the purchaser or consumer. Notwithstanding any
other provision, it is the purpose and intent of this Chapter that
the tax imposed hereunder is, in fact, a levy on the purchaser
. . . and the levy on the dealers as specified is merely as agent
of the State for collection of said tax.47
Once the court found that the dealer was the "taxpayer" under the statute,
he was easily held liable for payment of the tax despite the fact that the
segregated proceeds had been stolen from him."8
The Supreme Court of Florida took a different approach to the same
problem. The Florida sales tax was found to be ambiguous as to whether
it was levied on the vendor or the vendee. The court concluded that the
tax was on the vendee with the vendor coerced by statute to collect and
remit the proceeds to the state. The court reasoned that voluntary public
officers holding state money in trust are not relieved of liability for loss
of funds due to theft. But a vendor who is unwillingly made a trustee
and agent for the state in collecting and keeping the tax is not liable in
case of loss or theft, provided reasonable care was employed to protect
the funds."9
The Indiana sales tax seems to make the consumer primarily liable
for the tax with the retail merchant secondarily liable. Yet, the retail
merchant still retains many elements of primary liability. For instance,
if he fails to collect the tax or makes a mistake in calculating or collecting
the tax on a given sale he undoubtedly remains liable. It also seems
probable that he would be liable in case of loss or theft through no fault
of his own. Although this may be satisfactory with respect to pure lia-
bility analysis, from a federal standpoint it may not appear entirely con-
sistent with the trustee-beneficiary relationship inherent in the statutory
trust. The argument can be made that the state is really looking to the
dealer for payment of the tax. As an incidental advantage given to the
dealer, he can pass the tax on to the consumer, much like a manufacturer
can pass on the federal excise tax to the dealer."0 Since the state is put-
47. Ga. Acts 1951, § 12(a) at 372.
48. Williams v. Bear's Den, Inc., 214 Ga. 240, 104 S.E.2d 230 (195S).
49. Spencer v. Mero, 52 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1951).
50. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
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ting its primary reliance on the dealer, the statutory trust is not relevant
in the context of the tax liability, and therefore the trust should fail as it
did for the excise taxes in It re Tele-Tone Radio Corp. 1
However the ultimate issue of the validity of the trust device is re-
solved, it seems clear that, in any attempt to impose the trust, the state
must show that funds were actually collected by the merchant from his
purchasers. First, it is obvious that the state could not reasonably con-
tend that the intended incidence of the tax is on the purchaser in a case
where the merchant has failed to collect. But, beyond this, broader con-
siderations indicate the propriety of imposing a requirement that the state
show that collections were made. Conventional trust law sanctions a
mere declaration by the settlor that he holds certain of his property in
trust for another and constitutes himself trustee.2 Therefore, a statute
stating that such a declaration would be implied in law would have some
basis in common-law precedent. The Indiana statute might admit of
such a construction."3 However, the trust would appear then to be indis-
tinguishable from the more usual unperfected statutory lien, the very sub-
ject to which the fourth priority of section 64a(4) of the Bankruptcy
Act 4 applies. In view of the fact that recognition of the trust device in
this situation would open the way to its use in any tax scheme, without
regard to the legally intended incidence, it is most probable that the rea-
soning exemplified in Morgan v. Commissioner" would be invoked to
prevent the possibility of wholesale gutting of section 64a(4). Where
the state cannot show that collections were in fact made, its claim should
be characterized as a tax claim and given fourth priority status.
II. THE REQUIREMENT OF TRACING THE PROCEEDS
Given the finding of a valid trust, satisfaction of the state's claim
before those of the creditors may depend upon the ability of the state to
trace the proceeds of the collection. The problem may become a vital
one, for it is unlikely that the bankrupt merchant will have segregated
the funds in the ordinary course of his business. For the purposes of
51. 133 F. Supp. 739 (D.NJ. 1955). See text accompanying note 33 supra. The
danger of the occurrence of such a result could have been avoided easily by rejecting
the imposition of personal liability for the tax and using a system of stiff monetary
penalties for failure to collect from the constuner.
52. 1 ScoTT, TRusTs 166-67 (2d ed. 1956).
53. "Notwithstanding the amount of state gross retail tax collected from pur-
chasers, the retail merchant shall be liable for and shall remit 2% of . . . (his) gross
income. . . . Every retail merchant shall be personally liable for such taxes, which
shall constitute a trust fund in the hands of the retail merchant and shall be owned by
the state." Ire. ANN. STAT. § 64-2664 (Burns Supp. 1964).
54. 52 Stat. 874 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
55. 309 U.S. 78 (1939). See text accompanying note 32 supra.
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this discussion, it is necessary to distinguish between attempts to impose
the trust on funds collected prior to bankruptcy and funds collected after
bankruptcy.
The situation regarding sales tax collections made prior to the vital
petition date is quite different from that regarding collections made after-
wards. Assume a retail merchant has not segregated tax collections from
his other funds. He then files a petition in bankruptcy" or one is filed
against him.5" Typically, his bank balance plus cash on hand will not
equal the amount of sales taxes collected. When the state seeks the taxes
collected, the most ambitious contention it can make is that it should be
able to satisfy its tax trust claim prior to administration expenses from
all the assets the debtor possesses. The United States made this conten-
tion with respect to taxes withheld in trust by the bankrupt defendant
in In re Frank." The court, in refusing to accept such a contention,"5
said that if the merchant, as agent for the government, had held the taxes
separate there would have been no difficulty in collecting the entire fund.
However, where the agent failed to keep the collected or withheld taxes
separate, the government, like any other beneficiary of a trust, must fol-
low the diverted fund into property to which it can be traced. If the fund
cannot be traced there is nothing to take the case out of the prevailing rule
that a "beneficiary who cannot find trust property has no lien or charge
spread over the entire estate of the faithless trustee."6
Perhaps the most extreme position opposing the state's claim would
be that unless the merchant actually segregates taxes collected there can
really be no trust.6" This argument has been unsuccessful in striking
down a trust which has its basis in a statute.12  Once the existence of the
56. Bankruptcy Act § 4(a), 52 Stat. 845(a) (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 22(a) (1958).
57. Bankruptcy Act § 4(b), 52 Stat. 845(b) (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 22(b) (1958).
58. 25 F. Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
59. Specifically the government asserted it had a lien to the extent of withholding
taxes due spread over the entire assets of the bankrupt estate. Id. at 1006.
60. Ibid. In -re Frank may be taken as authority that Congress can contravene the
priorities of the Bankruptcy Act by calling an employer a trustee for withheld taxes
accrued prior to bankruptcy. It is of dubious applicability to a state-created trust
which would do the same thing. A decision which does squarely uphold a state-created
trust outside of bankruptcy is In re Heintzelman Constr. Co., Inc., 34 F. Supp. 109(W.D.N.Y. 1940), which involved the New York materialmen statute. See note 10 szpra.
61. This is advanced as the extreme anti-state position regarding the mechanics of
the tax collection. Obviously, a more fundamental argument suggested earlier is that
the state cannot under any guise circumvent the priorities of the Bankruptcy Act by way
of the statutory trust. In McKee v. Paradise, 299 U.S. 119 (1936), a bankrupt corpora-
tion had a welfare association for its employees. Resources for the association were not
segregated from corporate assets except by bookkeeping entries. The court held that the
mere shifting of figures in an account book does not create a trust; it is only the designa-
tion of a debt. A special account must be maintained if the trust is to be recognized.
62. Where a statute creates the trust fund, a special account need not be established.
The requirement for a special account goes to the intent of the parties in creating the
NOTES
trust is established it devolves upon the beneficiary to identify or trace
the trust property. If he fails to do so he is relegated to the position of
a general creditor. 3 To charge the bankrupt estate with the proceeds of
a trust, the fund must be clearly traced.64 The tracing must be specific;
and it is not considered sufficient tracing, by weight of authority, to show
that the estate has been augmented by the amount of the trust or that the
trust is somewhere in the estate.6"
In In re State Motors Inc.,6 a leading case on the tracing of statutory
tax trusts, the bankrupt owed social security and withholding taxes held
in trust. The president of the corporation drew a check and had it certi-
fied by the bank in favor of the Treasury Department. The check was
never delivered to the Treasury Department but was eventually turned
over to the trustee in bankruptcy who sought the referee's instructions
as to disposition of the check."7 Based on the facts that there had been
no real delivery as required by negotiable instruments law and that the
Nithheld funds could not be "traced" the referee ruled that there was no
recognizable trust fund. The district court reversed the referee's deci-
sion and the Treasury Department was allowed to claim the check as a
recognizable trust fund. The court reasoned that withheld taxes were
never part of the assets of the firm since the bankrupt was supposed to
collect or withhold those taxes for the government; and of the amounts
received by the bankrupt, a certain percentage of each dollar immediately
became the property of the United States. On the firm's books those
funds were designated in accordance with an accounting system so they
would not appear as assets of the firm. Certifying the check effectively
took it out of the firm's reachable assets and from that moment on the
sum of the check belonged to the United States.6
State Motors should be contrasted with Mountaineer Eng'r Co. v.
Bossart."9 In Mountaineer Eng'r the debtor mailed his check for taxes
trust. Where the trust has been created by statute segregation of the trust res is not es-
sential to give life to the trust. New Jersey v. Pilot Mfg. Co., 199 A.2d 78, 82, 83 NJ.
Super. 177, 184 (1964).
63. Schuyler v. Littlefield, 232 U.S. 707, 713 (1913).
64. In re Leigh, 208 Fed. 486 (N.D. Ill. 1913).
65. Lowell v. Brown, 284 Fed. 936, 941 (1st Cir. 1922). See Note, 29 GEORGETOWN
L.J. 528 (1941).
66. 168 F. Supp. 82 (E.D. Mich. 1958).
67. A trustee who proceeds without court authorization and pays pre-bankruptcy
charges out of turn may render himself liable on his bond. Bankruptcy Act § 50, 52 Stat.
863 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 78 (1958). In re Lambertville Rubber Co., 111 F.2d 45 (3d Cir.
1940).
6S. A certified check is more than a promise by an acceptor to assume the payment
of the check. It is a warranty that funds sufficient for that purpose are presently on
deposit and have been set aside for that use. It is considered equivalent to payment.
Watchel v. Rosen, 164 N.E. 326, 249 N.Y. 386 (1928).
69. Mountaineer Eng'r Co. v. Bossart, 133 WV. Va. 668, 57 S.E.2d 633 (1950).
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to the Treasury Department but it was not honored on presentation for
payment because an attachment had been levied on the debtor's bank ac-
count in the meantime. The court ruled that the check had not effected
an equitable assignment of the funds because it was nothing more than
an indication to the bank to pay the bearer upon presentation of the check.
Until payment the check did not earmark those funds because it would be
possible for the debtor to exhaust his account by writing other checks."0
In sum, a non-delivered certified check has proven effective to trace the
trust fund; but a delivered check which has not yet been presented to the
bank is not sufficient to trace the tax fund.
Tracing funds through a bank account is a question of the mathe-
matical balance between taxes collected and the level of the bank account.
When a fiduciary commingles his own funds with trust funds, it is pre-
sumed that he draws first from his own funds as long as a balance re-
mains equal to the sum held in trust." The fiduciary is presumed to
leave the trust funds untouched because every man is deemed to have
acted honestly and done right rather than wrong." If the mingled fund
is at any time depleted, the trust money cannot be treated as reappearing
in sums subsequently deposited into the same account from different
sources.7 1 In the intermediate case, where the account is reduced to a
sum smaller than the trust fund, the rule is that the latter is regarded as
dissipated except as to the balance. Funds subsequently added from
other sources cannot be subjected to the trust claim.74 If at any point
the bank account dips below the amount of taxes collected up to that par-
ticular time, the trust fund is only replenished as to sales taxes collected
subsequent to that date. 5 Evidently, if the merchant fails to collect the
sales tax there is nothing on which the trust can operate.
The question of tracing is clouded by one more problem. Prior to
Erie R.R. v. Tompkinsm" federal courts applied equitable principles to trace.
The problem is unresolved yet as to the extent to which, under applicable
state law, a cestui can go in tracing his proceeds. If, for instance, state
law gave the cestui a lien spread out through the entire estate of a bank-
70. Had the check been honored immediately prior to the levy of attachment it is
likely that the government would have prevailed. The rule seems to be that if the debtor
pays the beneficiary and the trustee attempts to recover the payment, the burden of proof
(for this discussion, proof of failure to trace) is on the trustee. Lowell v. Brown, 284
Fed. 936, 941 (1st Cir. 1922).
71. 26 R.C.L. Trusts § 220 (1920).
72. Barrs v. Barrs Rent-A-Car Co., 71 Ohio App. 465, 467, 50 N.E.2d 388, 389
(1943).
73. In re Supreme Alliance & Heating Co., 113 F. Supp. 228, 230 (W.D. Ky. 1953).
74. 4 COLLiER, BANKRUPTCY f 70.25 [2] (14th ed. 1964).
75. 26 R.C.L. Trusts § 221 (1920).
76. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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rupt, should the federal courts recognize such a lien? The best reasoning
supports the notion that federal courts should not allow the state to do
indirectly what it cannot do directly. Therefore, to insure uniform
application of the Bankruptcy Act, equitable principles should be applied,
disregarding state law as to the extent to which trust funds may be
traced.7"
The conventional requirement of tracing has been handled quite dif-
ferently where proceeds were collected by a debtor in possssion or a re-
ceiver after bankruptcy. In City of New York v. Rassner7 it was clear
that almost none of the tax funds collected after bankruptcy remained
for distribution; nevertheless, the court allowed the state to impress its
trust on funds which had come from the sale of chattels and the invalida-
tion of certain mortgages, doing away with tracing altogether.79 It did
so on the rationale that, after the petition, continued operation of the
business was under the court's control; the bankruptcy court, as a court
of equity, could not countenance that one of its officers might mishandle
a trust fund in his care. If he did, the bankruptcy court, to ensure equit-
able distribution of the estate, would be compelled to make good the trust
fund from whatever assets remained."0
The Second Circuit's position with respect to tracing in Rassner has
been followed in the Sixth Circuit in Hercules Serv. Parts Corp. v. United
States"l and in the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Sampsell."2 Both cases
held that where a statutory trust for taxes is imposed, the beneficiary of
the trust need not trace taxes which accrue while the business is under the
custody of the bankruptcy court and cited Rassner with approval. One
reason the Hercules court advanced for upholding the trust provision
without tracing was that by paying the beneficiary of the trust first, the
creditors would not "receive less than that to which they were originally
entitled and that which they would have received if the officer of the
law had performed his obligation."8  A similar consideration was men-
tioned in Rassner, where the court noted that where a business is con-
tinued, the receiver is subject to local taxes like any other individual.84
77. 4 CoLLiE, BANIrRUETCY op. Cit. Supra note 74.
78. 127 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1942).
79. Id. at 705.
80. Id. at 706.
81. 202 F.2d 938 (6th Cir. 1953).
82. 193 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1951).
83. Hercules Serv. Parts Corp. v. United States, 202 F.2d 938 (6th Cir. 1953).
84. City of New York v. Rassner, 127 F.2d 703, 707 (2d Cir. 1942). Cf. Airline-
Arista Printing Corp., 156 F. Supp. 403, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1957): "The estate must neces-
sarily have benefited and the assets coming into the trustee's hands have been increased
to the extent of the taxes withheld by the failure of the debtor to pay these funds over
to the beneficiary."
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
But this reasoning seems to run contrary to the rule in tracing that a
mere showing by the cestui that the estate was augmented by the amount
of the trust is insufficient to trace the trust funds.85
POLICY AND PROCEDURE IN ABSTENTION: IS THE PULLMAN
RETENTION TECHNIQUE PROPER?
The United States Supreme Court has developed an abstention doc-
trine whereby in a case in which the federal district court properly has
jurisdiction exercise of that jurisdiction is refused, and the litigant is
left to present all or some of the issues of the case to a state tribunal to
obtain an adjudication of his rights. The basis of this practice is com-
monly referred to as the "doctrine of equitable abstention"' since the
power to decline exercise of jurisdiction was found originally in the
discretion of the chancellor sitting in equity.' However, a recent state-
ment of the Court indicates that the device is founded on principles far
broader than mere equitable considerations and is equally applicable in
suits at law.'
The abstention device, as formulated in Railroad Comnn' v. Pull-
mnn4 and applied in federal question cases, represents a judicial attempt
to adjust the interests of the states and the national government, mani-
fested in the federal judiciary. On the one hand, there is a pressing state
85. Matter of Horigan Supply Co., 2 F.2d 791, 792 (8th Cir. 1924). The soundness
of the reasoning in Rassner and Hercides can be questioned. Any creditor can make
the argument that his money benefited the estate. Might not the debtor in possession
use unsegregated taxes collected in his business dealings and prolong final adjudication,
dissipating the remaining assets in so doing? Might not creditors who rely on the dis-
torted financial picture of the debtor be misled?
1. Note, The Doctrine of Equitable Abstention, 2 RAcE REr.. L. REP. 1222 (1957);
Note, J udicial Abstention From the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction, 59 COL. L. Rnv. 749
(1959).
2. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964); Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v.
Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1951) ; Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317-18
(1943) ; Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941).
3. In Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959), the
Court upheld an abstention order in an eminent domain proceeding despite its recogni-
tion that eminent domain has been classified for some purposes as a proceeding at law.
The Court indicated that, although the prior abstention cases it relied on had been
equitable, those cases did not apply a technical rule of equity procedure. They were
thought rather to "reflect a deeper policy derived from our federalism." Id. at 28. The
fact that the prior cases were in equity appears to be a matter of coincidence, a result
following from the nature of the relief usually sought (i.e., injunction of the application
of state law to the complainant). In this context, the broad discretionary power of the
chancellor furnished a convenient means of accomplishing the desired result.
4. 312 U.S. 496.
